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Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter famously prohibits
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of states. Yet armed conflict, whether international or
non-international, continues, with a depressing regularity, to be a
feature of world politics. Even more depressing is the fact that much
of the misery that armed conflict entails is visited upon persons who
are not combatants. I propose to address the death and injury which
these innocent victims of war suffer - especially in elective
international conflicts - and the remedies to which they should be
entitled. I cannot promise you a simple solution, even though this is a
problem for which legal-and moral-principles seem to me to be
clear, but I believe that I can clarify the application of those
principles and show that the United States and the world community
can do better and that their own policies and interests compel it.
* Distinguished Lecture, St. Thomas University School of Law, October 11, 2012.
An earlier, shorter version of this paper was presented as the keynote address at the
CIVIC Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, on January 23, 2012. The work of the
"Center for Civilians in Conflict," a non-governmental organization committed to
"mak[ing] warring parties more responsible to civilians before, during, and after
conflict" has inspired this lecture. I also gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance of Romain Zamour and Peter Picht.
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I.
"A right without a remedy is no right at all."' International
law has framed this basic, indeed definitional, principle in terms of
the necessary consequences of an illegal act. In a classic formulation
in the Chorz6w Factory case in 1928, the Permanent Court of
International Justice declared:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion
of an illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed.2
Numerous international instruments on the law of war reflect
the Chorz6w principle. Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907 states:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of
the Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to
pay compensation. 3
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 provides, in
similar terms, that
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions
of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
Lord Denning in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] AC, p. 435,
cited in Rosalyn Higgins, The role of domestic courts in the enforcement of
international human rights: The United Kingdom, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 38 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco
Francioni eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997); see also Factory at
Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
2 Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
3 Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land




part of its armed forces.
These arrangements are plainly animated by humanitarian
motives, but they have two problematic features. First, in both of
these provisions, it is not the injury suffered by the victim that is the
key prerequisite to a remedy. It is the legal violation. Without that
violation there is, apparently, no obligation to remedy the injury.
Second, in both provisions, the victim who has suffered the injury is
not the direct recipient of the remedy.
Both the Chorz6w judgment and the law of war instruments
make compensation conditional on an illegal act, but they often
provide significantly less than they appear to promise. Consider a
mundane but cruel example:
Lieutenant Smith and his platoon, in the course of a military
action in a foreign country, injure and paralyze a local woman, guilty
only of living where the belligerents decided to confront each other.
If the platoon did not violate the law of war, their action was not
illegal and the state, on whose behalf they were acting, has no
obligation to provide a remedy.
None of the cited provisions addresses the possibility of
compensation for injuries caused by acts which themselves were not
wrongful. As perverse as it sounds, the operative legal principle here
is the "irresponsibility for injuries."
Now, there is certainly nothing remarkable in the notion that
the consequences of an illegal action should be repaired by those
causing them. But it does not follow, as a necessary corollary, that
compensation should not be owed for injuries caused by officials
who were operating lawfully and whose actions were, accordingly,
not illegal. Does it not seem anachronistic to proceed to say that
contemporary international law, which has incorporated the
protection of human rights, nonetheless holds that when officials of
one state in the course of performing a public function, kill or injure
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 91,
reprinted in INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HANDBOOK
216, 242 (12th ed. 1983), http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.
xsp?action=openDocurnent&documentld=F461FC196C18A52DC12563CD005 1E
2AC [hereinafter Protocol 1].
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a man, woman or child of another state or destroy their property, no
international right has been violated and no obligation to provide a
remedy comes into operation?
A second problem with the law of war provisions is the
procedure they incorporate for compensation. In contemporary
international human rights law and international investment law, the
actual injured party is afforded standing as the claimant and receives
compensation. By contrast, in the law of armed conflict, the
principle of compensation is "depersonalized." By
"depersonalization" I mean that a legal fiction holds that the injury
suffered by an individual human being through the action of an agent
of another state is an injury to that individual's state; hence it is the
injured individual's state which is alone entitled to make the claim
for the injury and to receive compensation for it. This fiction
hearkens back to an era in international legal theory in which states
were the sole subjects of international law; only they bore rights
under it and only they could make claims against other states.
Therefore, the death or injury of a person in violation of international
law was deemed an injury to that individual's state. Only when that
state lodged and then collected compensation for the injury (an event
not likely to occur, if at all, until far into the future) was there a
chance that the compensation (or part of it) might trickle down to the
individual who actually suffered the injury.
A fiction, Jeremy Bentham reminds us, is a lie.5
II.
In many developed legal systems, the principles of
irresponsibility for legal injury and depersonalization of
compensation have come to seem anomalous. Tort law in many
jurisdictions now recognizes a state's duty to compensate its own
citizens for injuries suffered as a result of governmental actions
which were not themselves wrongful.
'C. K. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS xviii (1932).
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Consider two comparative examples. In France, through the
19th century, state liability was the exception6 and was based only on
wrongful action ("responsabilit6 pour faute"). In 1895, however,
the notion of state liability without fault was introduced. There are
now two kinds of state liability without fault in French law: liability
for risk ("responsabilit6 pour risque") and liability for breach of the
principle of equality ("responsabilit6 pour rupture de l'6galit6 devant
les charges publiques"). 9 State liability without fault may be based
on a "special risk" which may be created by use of dangerous things,
like explosives'0 or weapons." A special risk may also be created by
dangerous methodsl2 or dangerous situations.13  In 1951, in the
context of domestic police operations, the Conseil d'Etat made a
further distinction, between people who are the objects of the
operations and people who are the unintended victims of the
operations ("6trangers aux op6rations de police").14 If, during police
operations, people "6trangers" to the operations are hurt, then even
though there is no fault, there is state liability. If, however, people
who are the objects of the operations are hurt, then state liability
comes into operation if the official's action was wrongful.
6 RENE CHAPUS, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF GtNtRAL TOME 1 1227 (15th ed. 2001),
available at http://attacheterritorialprep.unblog.fr/files/20 10/01/fichel 0
droitadministratiflaresponsabiliteadministrative.pdf ("Pendant tout le XIXe siecle,
la possibilit6 d'imposer A la puissance publique l'obligation de r6parer les
dommages caus6s par son action (ou son inaction) a eu un caractbre
exceptionnel.").
7 See id. at 1293-1334.
8 Id. at 1335.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., CE 28 mars 1919, Regnault-Desroziers (explosion of ammunitions);
see also MARCEAU LONG ET AL., LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE
ADMINISTRATIVE 205-12 (17th ed. 2009).
" See, e.g., CE Ass. 24 juin 1949, cons. Lecomte et Franquette et Daramy (gun).
Note that, when it comes to weapons, all firearms, but firearms only, have been
considered to constitute state liability without fault; see CHAPUS, supra note 6 at
1338, available at http://archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de/france/saja/ja/1949_06_24
b ce.htm.
12 See CHAPUS, supra note 6, at 1341-45.
13 Id. at 1345-47.
14 CE Sect. 27 juillet 1951, Dme Auberg6 et Dumont.
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Professor Dotan has neatly summarized the reasons for this
development in French administrative law:
In the area of administrative torts, there has developed
a recognition of the duty of the administrative
authority to pay damages without fault, based, among
other things, on the principle of equality, according to
which, when an administrative action which was
taken for the benefit of the community as a whole,
[cost of the] injury has to be distributed, in accordance
with the principle of equality, among all citizens, by
means of compensation to the individual from the
public treasury.' 5
In Israeli law, a comparable development has taken place. "In
circumstances such as these," Professor Barak-Erez, now on the
Israeli Supreme Court, explains, "the policy objective of the
ascription of responsibility is not to deter the public authority or to
direct it to operate differently in the future, but rather to prevent an
unequal allocation of the public burden [as a consequence of the
authority's actions] ."6
In German law, courts have reached the same material result
by a slightly different route. The doctrine of "Aufopferung" in
German public law holds that someone who has been compelled to
make a sacrifice for the benefit of the society as a whole ought to be
compensated for the sacrifice, at least with regard to the
economically measurable damages resulting from the sacrifice. The
sacrifice must, however, go beyond the degree of contribution that
every citizen has to make for the benefit of the community; it must
be an "extraordinary sacrifice" (Sonderopfer). The action by the state
agent must have been lawful and is, thus, distinct from a claim for
15 Yoav Dotan, lot Tviah Tzeborit vePetzuim Lilo Ashem (Public Causes of Action
and Damages Without Fault) in MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 97, 106 (1994), cited
in Estate of Decedent Soumiah Zidan et al v. State of Israel, A 752/04, Haifa
District Court, 30 November 2011 (Isr.).
16 Daphna Barak-Erez, Avalot Chukatiot Beldan Chukei HaYesod (Constitutional
Torts in the Era of Basic Laws) in 9 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 103, 117 (2005), cited
in Estate of Decedent Soumiah Zidan et al v. State of Israel, A 752/04, Haifa
District Court, 30 November 2011 (Isr.).
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damages suffered as a result of an unlawful state action.' 7
The principle in these national systems is quite clear: where
an individual member of the community has been injured by a public
action which was undertaken for the benefit of all members of the
community, the other members of the community should share in the
loss of the injured victim. Without such burden-sharing, a hapless
member of the community will suffer for the benefit of all others
who will simply be free-riders.
If this (to me) self-evident moral proposition can operate
within a community, should it not apply a fortiori when the injured
person is not a member of the community and is, thus, gaining no
benefit from the injury he or she has suffered? In comparison to a
domestic victim, the foreign victim is doubly injured-by the act and
by the absence of enjoyment of any indirect benefit from it as a
member of the community on whose behalf the injurious act was
done.
In international law, intimations of a comparable doctrine
may be found in the International Law Commission's work on
articles on international liability without fault.' 8 In grappling with the
problem, the Commission's predicate was that in contemporary
industrial, scientific and technologically-based civilizations, some
actions taken by states or under their authority, which are legally
permissible and, moreover, promise to be beneficial to the
community as a whole, may nonetheless present a high risk of
considerable injury to others. In the words of the ILC's
Commentary:
Regardless of any preventive measures that States
may take in undertaking activities, they may
nevertheless be unable to prevent the occurrence of
' BGHZ 9, 83 (85f) = NJW 1953, 857; BGHZ 13, 88 (91) = NJW 1954, 993;
BGHZ 45, 58 (76) = NJW 1966, 1021; BGHZ 65, 196 (206); Arnulf Schmitt-
Kammler, Der Aufopferungsgedanke, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 1995, 473 et seq.
'8 As to the basis for this work., see Survey of State Practice Relevant to
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, Secretariat Study, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 1985,
Vol. II, Part One (Addendum), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part
I/Addl).
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injuries in the territory of another State. The concept
of liability for injuries to others, in the absence of
fault, is not new in domestic law. In the case of
certain activities, a causal relationship between the
activity and the injury is sufficient to entail liability.
This concept in domestic law has been continuously
promoted for reasons of morality, social policy and
maintenance of public order.19
This principle has been invoked in some international
incidents. To cite one example, when the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954
crashed on Canadian territory in 1978, Canada referred to the general
principle of the law of "absolute liability" for injury resulting from
high risk activities. The implication was that governmental entities
which engage in permissible, but extremely dangerous, activities
cannot simply externalize the risk onto others, but should be
responsible for the injurious consequences of such activities.
III.
There are many parallels between these clear domestic and
incipient international trends and the unintended, but foreseeable,
injuries resulting from the conduct of military activities by one state
in the territory of another state:
* by their nature, military activities are extremely dangerous;
* the activities are carried out for the benefit of the collective
community of the state that conducts them;
* apart from the explicit and licit targets of such activities,
military activities pose a risk of serious physical injury or
property damage to those who are neither engaged in the
conflict nor targeted and who are supposed to be insulated
from the military action.
Yet, in that part of the corpus of international law concerned
with regulating armed conflict, we find, instead of a legal
development parallel to the general principle in developed national
19 Id. at 77-78, para. 358.
2013] COMPENSATING COLLATERAL DAMAGE
legal systems, quite contradictory legal arrangements. We find, first,
a deviation from enlightened domestic practice with respect to state
torts in the administrative law of developed legal systems, which
may qualify as a general principle of law in civilized states. We find,
second, a deviation from the well-established obligation of
compensation to aliens for violations of customary international law.
We find, third, a deviation from the development of absolute liability
for extremely hazardous activities. And we find, fourth, a deviation
from international law's principle of all human beings' right to live
and to enjoy their property.
All of these glaring deviations are accomplished under the
rubric of the seemingly innocuous legal term "collateral damage."
The term holds that actions involving the use of armed force which
cause injury to non-combatant persons or their property, but which
were conducted in conformity with the requirements of the law of
armed conflict, are not per se wrongful. Such actions will not be
deemed wrongful if they were (i) prompted by military necessity and
(ii) were proportional to that necessity. And since such actions will
not be deemed wrongful, they will not, the argument goes, incur an
international legal obligation of compensation.
Collateral damage is what we lawyers call a terminus
technicus, a technical term. Technical terms can be valuable tools in
intellectual discourse. One of their functions, whether in law or in
medicine, is to present their referent so clinically and so
emotionlessly that it facilitates dispassionate analysis. Sometimes,
however, technical terms "over-fulfill" their purpose by infiltrating
ordinary speech and becoming euphemisms. The technical term
"collateral damage" has made that transition: it is useful to recall that
it means killing and injuring noncombatant men, women and
children and destroying their property. The term of art may make it
easier for decent people to do things they would ordinarily shrink
from by anesthesizing moral self-doubt and insulating the party that
has caused the damage arising from their actions from international
criminal responsibility. All of that may be necessary insofar, as
societies often need to perform what sociologists call society's "dirty
work." But should the technical term be used to absolve the
community for whose benefit the dirty work has been done from a
9
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civil obligation to compensate, directly and promptly, the innocent
victims or their survivors? And should that obligation operate
regardless of whether the actions of the damage-feasor violated the
laws of war?
I submit as a general principle that where the community
pursues lawful actions whose foreseeable consequence is injury to
individuals, the injuries suffered should be compensated. That should
include the injuries we call collateral damage in the law of war.
IV
Like other abnormally dangerous activities, a state conducts
military action for the benefit of its own community as a whole. The
way a military unit chooses to conduct a particular action is
determined by the extent to which it is expected to contribute to its
own objectives. For that reason, the likelihood of collateral damage
occurring is inversely proportional to the danger to which the
military actor's personnel are exposed. And it is foreseeable.
Let me explain with a very simple example: the closer to the
ground a military aircraft flies, the better the pilot of that aircraft will
see his or her target. Thanks to that greater visibility, the aircraft's
rocket or cannon fire or its gravity bombs are more likely to achieve
their target and less likely to cause collateral damage. But the nature
of visibility is that it is reciprocal: If I can see you, you can see me.
Visibility is inter-visibility. So the closer the aircraft is to the
ground, the more vulnerable it is to fire from the ground defenses
within which the target is embedded. The aircraft may achieve a
greater margin of safety by making itself less visible by flying
higher, but that will increase the likelihood of collateral damage on
the ground.
Now my point is not that a principle of international law
requires or should require the aircraft to fly lower and, while
reducing the probability of collateral damage, expose itself to a
higher probability of destruction. Perhaps principles of chivalry
should require this; perhaps not. Perhaps international law should
require this; perhaps it should not. In both normative systems, the
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issue is debatable from many perspectives. The point is, rather, that
an actor's inherently dangerous activity is being conducted, by
conscious choice, in a way that is less hazardous to the actor and
more hazardous to others. The cost of the collateral injury is being
shifted from the military actor and onto an innocent non-combatant.
The calculus of cost-shifting is particularly manifest when
democratic states engage in so-called "elective international
conflicts," a species of armed conflict with which this lecture is
especially concerned. These are conflicts which are not fought out of
a perceived urgent defensive necessity, but are undertaken as one of
a number of available strategies to secure a goal which is not
popularly viewed as existential. Nor is the proactive use of military
force in elective conflicts necessarily unlawful. A United Nations
peacekeeping operation is elective for the states that decide to
contribute supplies or personnel. NATO's actions in Serbia and
Kosovo and in Libya were, from the perspective of the participating
members of the military alliance, elective conflicts. But just because
elective conflicts are lawful or even virtuous does not mean that they
do not cause collateral damage. Indeed, there may be imperatives in
some of these operations that increase the likelihood of collateral
damage.
Democratic states which engage in an elective conflict are
particularly prone to the dilemma of a correlative "elective collateral
damage." Without a compelling demonstration that these conflicts
must be fought in order to preserve their own body-politic, a
democratic electorate will be loath to support an elective war if the
cost in terms of the lives of its troops and its treasure gets too high.
So, figuratively speaking, the aircraft of democratic states engaged in
elective conflicts-or more generally, their selection of weapons-
will always be subject to a political imperative to "fly higher;" as a
consequence, there will be more predictable collateral damage. Thus,
the benefit to the democratic state, and in instances of authorization
to use force by the world community for its inclusive benefit, comes
at the cost of the victims of collateral damage. Collateral damage is
being traded off to minimize injuries to one's own combatants. If the
policy analysis with respect to injuries caused by lawful
administrative actions, which I reviewed a few moments ago, were
11I
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applied to a state's foreign military activities, the cost of the
collateral damage should be borne by the Treasury of the community
which is the correlative beneficiary.
Discharging the state from a duty to repair the injuries caused
in armed conflict to non-combatants is also problematic when
viewed through another prism, that of the international protection of
human rights. A duty of reparation for injuries is fundamental to the
notion of human rights and may be deemed a corollary of the
international minimum standard. As a general human rights matter, a
state may not discriminate, with regard to those subject to its
jurisdiction and control, between its own nationals and foreign
nationals. But states which have developed a legal distinction
between so-called "police actions" and "belligerent actions" do this.
An injury resulting from application of the military instrument to its
own nationals will be called a "police action" and it leads to
compensation. The same action injuring a foreign national will be
called a "belligerent action" and will not be the legal basis for
compensation.
V,
If I have made my case for compensating the victims of
collateral damage, let me turn to its procedure and timing. The
Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross to
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I, states:
On the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Parties can in
principle deal with the problems relating to war
damage in general and those relating to the
responsibility for starting the war, as they see fit.20
Professor Benvenisti, the leading scholar in the area, shares
the ICRC's concern with what he calls "the adverse consequences of
recognizing individual suits [before then] .21
20 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
1), 8 June 1977.
21 EYAL BENVENISTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATIONs 334 (2004)
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These purported justifications of the depersonalization and
deferral of compensation for innocent victims of elective
international conflict, whether on account of violations of the law of
war or on account of collateral damage, make little sense in
contemporary armed conflict. Nowadays, most armed conflict is not
a temporally demarcated phenomenon that commences with a
declaration of war and concludes with a signature of surrender or a
peace treaty. Rather, it occurs in spurts of violence. Serial wars pause
to catch their breath, as it were; fragile cease-fires are broken when
one of the belligerents deems it advantageous. In some instances,
military force is not used in a traditional war with the intention of
achieving a decisive victory but in a limited action to preempt
possible counter-action or to degrade the offensive capacity of a
long-term adversary. The ICRC's assumption of a precise conclusion
to a war, accomplished by a treaty of peace or of surrender, has
become the rare exception. So deferring claims of or on behalf of
victims, whether for violations of the law of war or for collateral
damage, until the formal conclusion of the conflict, simply means
that most innocent victims of war will probably never receive
reparation. Justice delayed here will mean literally justice denied.
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Behrami and
Saramati cases, and the House of Lords in its judgment in Al Jeddah,
effectively blocked the possibility of compensation for collateral
damage caused by national forces in military actions conducted
within the framework of an international organization. These
decisions have been well described by Alexander Breitegger of the
University of Vienna as "sacrificing the effectiveness of the
European Convention on Human Rights on the altar of the effective
functioning of peace support operations."22 Certainly, promising that
(explaining that "[t]he settlement of numerous individual claims will not only be
cumbersome due to their sheer number and the need to examine each of them in
detail, but will in most cases stop short of providing a remedy to most individuals.
A comprehensive and durable solution necessitates investment in infrastructure
(schools, roads, job generation, etc.) which requires public funding. Cash payments
to individuals must be accompanied with agencies that administer saving funds and
arrangements that limit short-term spending to ensure long-term availability of
funds and prevent inflation.").
22 Alexander Breitegger, Sacrificing the Effectiveness of the European Convention
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states contributing forces to such military actions will be immune
from liability for injuries their troops may inflict on non-combatants
will make it easier to recruit those states for future international
peacekeeping operations. At the same time, member-states will not
be responsible for the debts of the international organization
authorizing the peace-keeping action. As for the organization itself,
it is dependent on member-states for its budget and, in any event, is
going to be judgment-proof. Bottom line: the innocent victims pay
for the benefits accruing to those that initiated the violence.
But if the objective of evading liability for collateral damage
is, indeed, "the effective functioning of peace support operations,"
the inter-state organizations, the governments, the European Court of
Human Rights and the House of Lords, may all be "penny wise and
pound foolish." Governments and the taxpayers funding them, like
all profit maximizers, are never enthusiastic about assuming
obligations to pay for anything, especially when they have succeeded
in evading the obligations in the past and externalizing those costs.
For obvious reasons, governments may have an incentive to
compensate their own citizens (and constituents) if they injure them,
but will be disinclined to compensate non-nationals for comparable
injuries.
Yet, there are compelling pragmatic, strategic reasons why
payment for collateral damage in elective armed conflict should not
fall prey to these economic disinclinations. In the so-called second
and third generation modes of warfare, innovated and used with
devastating effect by Chairman Mao and General Giap, the support
of the non-combatant population is deemed vital. Hence,
contemporary counter-insurgency theory now focuses on avoiding
alienating the non-combatant population. In those terms, timely
compensation to individuals who have suffered collateral damage
should be seen as a strategic device. (In that regard, one will be
disappointed by the much celebrated United States Counter-
Insurgency Manual, which makes no reference to compensation for
collateral injuries non-combatants suffer as a consequence of lawful
on Human Rights on the Altar of the Effective Functioning of Peace Support
Operations: A Critique of Behrami & Saramati and Al Jedda, 11 INT'L
COMMUNITY L. REv. 155, 174 (2009).
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military actions.) The point is that "strategic compensation" is self-
serving; in the area of collateral damage, strategic compensation and
international human rights converge.
All of these policy and pragmatic considerations should lead
to adjustments in the law of armed conflict in order to bring it into
conformity with general trends in domestic and international law.
The international community should affirm a general obligation of
reparation to individual non-combatants for unintended injuries
caused by military actions, whether those actions were lawful or
unlawful.
VI.
There are some encouraging international legal developments
with respect to this recommendation. In its 2004 Wall Advisory
Opinion, the International Court of Justice, in considering Israel's
responsibility for losses incurred by individual Palestinians as a
consequence of Israel's breaches of international humanitarian law,
got part of the matter right. It held that Israel "has the obligation to
make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal
persons concerned" and found that those reparations could entail
''compensation or other forms of reparation for the Palestinian
population."23 Even though the obligation derived, arguably, from a
violation of the law of armed conflict and not from collateral
damage, the right to reparation was "personalized."
A better example may be found in the incident in 1988 of the
downing of the Iranian Airbus by the U.S.S. Vincennes in the Persian
Gulf. President Reagan insisted that the U.S. action had not violated
the law of war; nevertheless, he promptly offered compensation
directly to the families of the victims. 24 The United States then
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 136 (July 9).
24 See Statement by Assistant to the President for Press Relations Fitzwater on
United States Policy Regarding the Accidental Attack on an Iranian Jetliner over
the Persian Gulf (July 11, 1988), reprinted in 2 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN,
1988-89, at 934-35 (1991), http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/
1988/071188b.htm.
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proceeded to pay.25
Alas, Congress has not adopted the Reagan formula. The
Foreign Claims Act (FCA)26 empowers the military to compensate
foreign nationals harmed by the U.S. military as long as "it did not
arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly from an
act of the armed forces of the United States in combat, [or] indirectly
related to combat .. ." The exclusion for harm caused by an action
of the enemy is unimpeachable, but the so-called "combat exclusion"
is not, for it means that the type of collateral damage with which I
have been concerned in this lecture is effectively precluded from the
scope of the Act.
For this latter type of collateral damage caused in combat, the
U.S. military has instituted a system of "condolence payments."
Condolence payments are nominal amounts (currently a
maximum of $2,500.00 for a life in Iraq) meant to express sympathy
and provide immediate monetary relief to innocent victims. Between
October 2001 and September 2003 all condolence-type payments
were specifically prohibited in Afghanistan and Iraq by order of
Central Command. Only after certain elements of the military
realized the need to provide some assistance to innocent victims was
the condolence payment program authorized. The documents
released show that while the condolence-payment system is a step
toward helping where the U.S. has harmed, the program fails to
properly deliver justice to civilians and, ultimately therefore, to
achieve its goal of winning support of the civilian population.27
CIVIC,28 the nongovernmental organization devoted to
addressing and remedying this problem, has proposed a separate and
permanent claims system for combat situations. Such a condolence
payment program, if it were implemented efficiently and with
25 See U.S. and Iran Settle Financial Claims, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at A23
(1996 WLRN 6561790).
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 2734 (West 2006).
27 Marla B. Keenan, Adding Insult to Injury: U.S. Military Claims System for
Civilians, in CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, (2008), http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/
files/ publications/2008 Civilian Casualties White Paper.pdf.
28 See generally CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (July 1, 2013), http://civiliansinconflict.
org/ uploads/files/Center 2pager.pdf.
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appropriate consideration for the victims and their families, would
both deal with a human right and constitute a strategic compensation
system.
In addition to establishing a permanent and free-standing
system, payment to the injured persons should be made promptly.
The insistence on the old model of state-to-state compensatory
arrangements at the end of the conflict confuses two entirely
different types of war injury: personal injury suffered by individuals
and general, infrastructural damage suffered by the community as a
whole. The latter, by its nature, must await the conclusion of the
conflict; the former should not have to wait. In this regard, some
recent compensation practices in Iraq and Afghanistan are
encouraging.
The mode of implementation has to be administrative.
Requiring the injured civilians to bring suit in the courts of the state
which has caused the injury is impracticable, from both the
perspective of the injured individual and the judicial system of the
foreign state. Until the right of victims of collateral damage to
reparation is established in conventional or customary international
law, it is hard to imagine national judges, even in monist systems,
awarding damages. But the prospect of the military force of the
injuring state itself deciding on the measure of damages and directly
making the payment may add insult to injury. A more practicable and
less offensive method, which would serve both humanitarian and
strategic purposes, would be to assign the liquidation of damages and
their distribution to a neutral entity, on the order of an NGO like the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
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Obviously, there are many problems in the implementation of
these proposals. It will often be unclear which side is responsible for
the collateral damage. When one side uses women and children as
human shields or emplaces anti-aircraft batteries by schools or
mosques, the party actually bombing or firing and causing the injury
may contend, reasonably, that it is not responsible for the ensuing
collateral damage. In many conflicts, the injured civilians may favor
the enemy and it will be tempting to ignore their claims lest a benefit
be given to the adversary. And there is always the danger of
transforming a program based upon a humanitarian motive into a
pay-to-kill exchange. Some of these problems are daunting, but there
are problems in the implementation of any legal arrangement,
including the perpetuation of the system in place.
The important issue is the principle involved: in conflict as in
peace, the party causing injury and benefitting from it should be
obliged to assume a civil liability to the victims and their survivors.
Whether or not its actions were internationally criminal, were caused
by a chain of grievous errors in the fog of war or were the inevitable
consequence of the strategy being pursued, innocent victims are
entitled to reparation. That repair should come from the party that,
hopefully in ways compatible with the law of war, elected to reduce
its own exposure to injury by shifting the danger and consequent
injury onto others-and the repair should come in a timely fashion.
General principles of law, human rights law and simple morality
require no less.
